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Laboratory experimentation was once considered impossible or irrelevant in economics. 
Recently, however, economic science has gone through a real ‘laboratory revolution’, and 
experimental economics is now a most lively subfield of the discipline. This study attempts to 
examine answers to questions of the changing behaviour of opposite sexes under conditions of 
both anonymity and knowledge of gender by playing the ultimatum game in Pakistan. It is 
observed that the behaviour of males and females in Pakistani society is quite different from 
that found in earlier studies. Insights from the previous experiments have already shown that 
normative economic theory had failed in its predictions of human behaviour. Currently, the 
ultimatum game is widely discussed in behavioural economic literature, and this paper will 
adjust the traditional ultimatum game into a new form wherein it will be tested in the country 
(Pakistan) with multidimensional behaviour of subjects. With regard to gender effect 
specifically, all previous studies came up with somewhat mixed results, since results do not 
always point in the same direction and it is rather early to draw far-reaching conclusions 
regarding the behavioural differences of men and women. More facts are required in order to 
move towards the development of a systematic theory. This work is a small attempt to 
investigate the changing behaviour of opposite sexes under different controlled conditions. 
JEL classification:  C72, C78, C91, C92, J16 
Keywords:  Ultimatum Game, Human Sex Difference, Social Behaviour 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There is substantial diversity in the social and economic behaviour of men and 
women in most of the societies around the globe. In Pakistan, socio-economic groups 
behave differently in bargaining. These behavioural differences in both genders may 
affect wages and other economic outcomes. Here it has been tried to test the behaviour of 
Pakistani people using the Ultimatum Game. The Ultimatum Game1 has been the basis 
for many experimental investigations and the outcomes of the ultimatum game are not 
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1In the ultimatum game (UG), two people, a first-mover (proposer) and a second-mover (responder), 
are allocated a sum of money, which they can share if they can come to an agreement. Responders decide 
whether to accept or reject offers from the proposers. Accepted offers are implemented but rejected offers result 
in both players receiving nothing. Because the proposer is allowed to make a take-it-or-leave-it offer and 
because the proposer knows any reasonable responder will accept even a little money rather than rejecting an 
offer, as the economic theory dictates the proposer should receive nearly all the money as something is better 
than nothing. But the game-theoretic prediction for this game is straightforward. If both players are rational in 
the sense that each is concerned only with maximising his own profit, proposer should propose to keep all but a 
penny for himself and give a penny to responder. Responder should accept this proposal since even a penny is 
better than nothing [Camerer and Thaler (1995) and Güth, et al. (1982)]. 
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consistent with the results expected from standard economic theory for one-shot and 
repeated games [Thaler (1998) and Roth (1995)]. 
Social Norms defining “Fairness” influence outcomes of Ultimatum Game. These 
norms vary across culture. Accordingly, ultimatum game has been studied in many different 
cultures [Croson and Buchan (1999); Roth, et al. (1991)]. However, we add to this literature 
by studying, for the first time; ultimatum game in Pakistan also by applying new statistical 
techniques which have never been used in existing literature. The experiment made in this 
paper involves four rounds of ultimatum game. In each round the size of the monetary stake 
remained unchanged and the gender of the players has been recorded. In the first two 
rounds the players remained mutually anonymous. But in the next two rounds the gender of 
the player is common knowledge. It had been tried to examine how the behaviour is 
affected by the knowledge about gender of the players, why do people offer more in their 
social negotiations, how people learn from their past experience and the consistency of 
social behaviour with the conventional economic wisdom. 
In the following sections a short overview of the related literature on ultimatum 
game, design of experiment along with the discussion over the experimental results from 
Pakistan. The final section was the conclusion and policy recommendation.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The role of gender in human decision-making has been extensively analysed in the 
literature. More specifically, gender differences have been investigated in the 
laboratory using several environments one of which is the Ultimatum Game (UG).2  
We now review the literature on effects of Gender on the Ultimatum Game, as a 
preliminary to our study of this issue in the context of Pakistan. 
As far as the Ultimatum Game (UG) is concerned, Eckel and Grossman (2001) 
conducted the UG experiment specifically designed to test for gender effects in the 
bargaining process. In their design employs the “game method3”, they implement an UG 
which is repeated along eight rounds. Proposers and respondents are matched using a face 
to face protocol. The sex of a subject’s partner is made known by having a group of four 
proposers seated facing a group of four respondents. Subjects have no information on 
their partner’s identity. They find that women proposals are, on average, more generous 
than men, regardless of the sex of the partner, and women respondents are more likely to 
accept an offer of a certain amount. Furthermore, a given offer is more likely to be 
accepted if it comes from a woman, a result which is interpreted as chivalry. Women 
paired with women almost never fail to reach an agreement. Our design of experiment is 
closer to Eckel and Grossman’s design. As in our study the players were seated face to 
face so that the players may see each other and make their ultimatum decision. Contrary 
to the findings of Eckel and Grossman, we find that males made more generous offers in 
the case where the gender of the responder was unknown, and also in the case where the 
responder was know to be female. This difference is most likely due to cultural 
differences. 
 
2See Eckel and Grossman (2005) for an exhaustive revision of differences in economic decisions of 
men and women. They examined these differences in several experimental scenarios. 
3In game method the proposer makes an offer which is presented to the responder, who then decides 
whether to accept or reject the given offer. 
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In another study, Solnick (2001) conducted a one-shot UG game using the strategy 
method.4 This method generates additional data (the minimum willingness can be 
analysed directly) but is thought to lead to more analytical decision-making states than the 
game method used by Eckel and Grossman (2001). Gender is communicated by the first 
name of the counterpart (a practice which Holm (2000) suggests yields the same results 
as informing the participant “your counterpart is a (fe)male student”; see also Fertshman 
and Gneezy (2001). The analysis involved two treatments. In first treatment, players 
remained mutually anonymous while in second treatment the gender of the players was 
known to both parties (proposer and responders). She analysed the players behaviour 
using Wilcoxon test and found that both sexes make lower offer to women and that both 
sexes choose higher minimum acceptable offer (MAO) when he/she faces a woman. In 
general the highest rejection rate exists when a women player faces a women player. 
There are two fundamental differences in our study and Solnick’s study which are (i) 
design of experiment, (ii) strategy to disclose player’s identity. In Solnick study the 
strategy method was used whereas we have not used strategy method (methodology of 
our study will be discussed in coming chapters). Solnick study revealed that players only 
knew the gender but they cannot see the players themselves while in our study the players 
were seated face to face without allowing them to talk to each other. Our results are 
substantially different from those of Solnick, most likely due to cultural differences 
between Pakistan and USA. 
Similarly, Saad and Gill (2001) conducted one shot UG in which subjects face 
randomly a subject of the same or contrary gender (i.e. man to woman, woman to man, 
man to man and woman to woman). Here each subject knew the sex of his/her partner. 
They found that males make more generous offers when pitted against female whereas, 
females made equal offers independently of the other’s sex. Our results are similar to 
Saad and Gill (2001) but here again there is difference of experimental design. We have 
tested the player’s behaviour under anonymity as well as full gender knowledge where as 
Saad and Gill tested the player’s behaviour with full gender knowledge. Also, we have 
used non-parametric test and logistic regression analysis to analyse the distributional 
pattern of offers made and the responders’ response to a given offer which was missing in 
the Saad and Gill’s study. In our study the female players have shown learning behaviour 
when the gender was unknown but this aspect of learning was not discussed in the Saad 
and Gill’s study. However, in the Saad and Gill study an interesting rather more 
important parameter of physical attractiveness of the subjects was discussed to explore 
the plausible reasons for the gender differences. They were also of the opinion that the 
physical attractiveness of the subject has a very important role in determining the 
behavioural response of the subjects in ultimatum game. Rating the physical 
attractiveness is not easy because this relates to the mental state of mind where the mood 
and attitude of the subject also play a pivotal role. Therefore, we have tried to exclude all 
those confounding parameter which may affect the behaviour of subjects other than 
gender to observe the natural response of the subjects when they were paired with a 
subject of opposite sex.  
 
4Under the strategy method, the proposer decides the offer and, at the same time, the responder records 
a minimum acceptable offer. If proposer’s offer equals or exceeds responder’s minimum acceptable offer, the 
offer is accepted and the pie divided according to proposer’s proposal. 
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The factor of physical attractiveness influencing the gender decision on the ultimatum 
game was also discussed by Solnick and Schweitzer (1999). The study revealed that one’s 
own attractiveness did not influence decision making but did influence the decision process of 
others. In particular, it was found that more was offered to attractive people and to men, even 
though attractive people and men did not demand more. In this study the expected earnings of 
attractive people were 8 to 12 percent greater than the expected earnings of un-attractive 
people, and the expected earnings of men were 13 to 17 percent greater than the expected 
earnings of women. Thus, the physical appearance significantly influenced the types of offers 
and demands negotiations. The implications of this study were consistent with Heilman’s 
(1983) and Rynes and Gerhart (1990) findings. 
Botelho, et al. (2000) postulated the hypothesis that behavioural differences in 
bargaining in UG stems from the differences in demographic characteristics of the 
subjects within each country. They used the data previously collected in the USA and 
Russia to test not only for the effects of nationality on behaviour but also for the effects 
of other demographic factors. They found that proposer behaviours were fairly similar 
across USA and Russia but there were substantial differences in behaviour across 
genders. The average offers made by female subjects in both USA and Russia about 45 
percent of pie whereas, male offered 31.5 percent of the pie. The results of this study are 
also in contradiction to our study. 
Sutter, et al. (2006) studied the influence of gender and gender pairing on 
economic decision making in an experimental two-person UG where the other party’s 
gender was known to both subjects. The game was played with four treatments (FF, FM, 
MF, MM) using the censored Tobit regression analysis it was observed that gender 
pairing systematically affects the behaviour. Moreover, competition and retaliation was 
observed which lowered the efficiency when the bargaining partners were having the 
same gender and vice versa. 
The composition of the gender related games also affects the decision of the 
subjects as examined by Dufwenberg and Muren (2005). They tried to explain how does 
gender composition influence team decisions. They use dictator game5 (DG) to address 
this issue. The results do indicate that there were significant gender effects in group 
decisions i.e. female-majority groups give more to individual recipient and also choose 
the equalitarian division more after than male-majority groups do. It was also found that 
the presence of a man triggers an exaggerated generosity among the women in the group. 
The results of Dufwenberg and Muren’s this study receives some support from the 
observations already raised by Stockard, et al. (1988). In another paper by Dufwenberg 
and Muren (2004) it was examined experimentally that how a person’s generosity 
depends on the degree of anonymity between given and recipient, as well as on the sex of 
either party. Here again dictator game was used and it was concluded that women were 
mere generous than man. 
However, to our knowledge there have been no prior studies involving ultimatum 
game to investigate gender effect in Pakistan. 
 
5In the dictator game, the first player, “the proposer”, determines an allocation (split) of some 
endowment (such as a cash prize). The second player, the “responder”, simply receives the remainder of the 
endowment not allocated by the proposer to himself. The responder’s role is entirely passive that he has no 
strategic input into the outcome of the game [Camerer and Fehr (2003)]. 
Ultimatum Game and Gender Effect 
 
27 
DESIGN OF EXPERIMENT 
The ultimatum game was tested in the Govt. Postgraduate College Nawabshah, 
Ghizer, Kharan, Rawlakot and Professional Academy of Common Knowledge, Lahore 
(PACK) separately at the stake size of Rs 100, consisting of four rounds. The stake size 
remained fixed through out the study.6 The advertisement about the game was done 
through pasting the posters in the institutes. No show up fee was taken from the 
participants. A short seminar was conducted in order to explain the rules of the game to 
the students. Thirty pairs of postgraduate students consisting of thirty male and thirty 
females from each Govt. College, were chosen except ten pairs of postgraduate students 
consisting of ten male and ten female, were chosen from PACK for the experiments. 
In the first round at Govt. Colleges, there were 15 male and 15 female proposers, 
with 15 male and 15 female responders but in PACK there were 5 male and 5 female 
proposers, with 5 male and 5 female responders. The identity and gender of the players 
was kept secret in the first two rounds. The experimenter was the only one who has 
complete knowledge of the player’s gender (identity). There was no opportunity for the 
mutual coordination among the proposers as well as the responders through out the 
experiment. The proposers were placed in one room and the responders in another. Two 
persons were assisting the experimenter.7  In the start of round every player was allotted 
an identity number. In each round the players (proposers) were given a slip to write their 
identity number and make their offer. They have only two minutes to make their offer 
and then the assistants collected the offer slips and took them to the responders to make 
their decision (either to accept or reject the offer). After making the decision, the slips 
were taken back and given to the experimenter and he then announced the resulting 
payoffs to the players. After the announcement the payment was made to the players 
according to their decided share. After that round the players have to answer a short 
questionnaire. The same methodology was adapted in the second round with a slight 
difference that male proposers were making their offers to the male responders and 
female proposers were making their offers to the female responders. However, the gender 
was still not the not known to both player’s parties. 
In the next two rounds (third and fourth) the players were seated face to face and the 
gender became a common knowledge. But still the players were not allowed to make mutual 
conversation. Here in the third round, all the male players were chosen to make offers to all 
the female responders. After that round both the parties have to answer the questionnaire 
regarding their decision and hand it over to the experimenter. In the fourth round, the role of 
proposer and responder was swapped within the mixed gender pairs selected in the third 
round. After all these experimental rounds, the players had passed through a short interview 
regarding their preferences and their attitude towards the opposite sex. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
(i)  Round  1 
In this round of play the both the player parties were ignorant of the gender of each 
other and there was no provision of making any bilateral or multilateral conversation 
 
6Including all the rounds 1, 2, 3, 4. 
7One man in the proposer’s room and the other in the responder’s room from the respective institute. 
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among them. The hypothesis we were trying to test here is that either the distribution of 
male and female offer differ significantly from each other or otherwise. In this context 
two sample Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test (K-S Test),8 for additional econometric analysis 
logistic regression model and mean comparison test have been used. 
While analysing the offer pattern of male and female in round I, it was observed 
that offers were not the same, meaning that there were significant differences in the offer 
pattern of male and female players according to the results of K-S Test (Table 1). As the 
computed p-value was less than significance level ( 05.0=α ), also the computed value of 
(Absolute Difference of Cumulative Distribution Functions) was D = 0.246 which was 
higher than the critical value of D = 0.175 at n=65 rejecting the null hypothesis.  
 
Table 1 
Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test for Distributional Analysis 
Variables 
Two Sample Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test 
(Two Tailed Test) 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 and 4 
D 0.246 0.138 0.331 
P-value 0.025 0.457 < 0.0001 
Alpha (Level of Significance) 0.05 0.05 0.05 
 
The gender effect was also analysed by using the test of mean comparison by 
taking in account the more offer given by either male or female. In Table 2 the results of 
mean comparison test for male and female offers have been shown for this purpose. It 
was observed that the male players on the average gave more offers than the female 
players as average male offers was 40.492 and average female offers was 37.538. These 
results were statistically significant to reject the null hypothesis of no difference in male 
and female offers. Graphically, it was represented in Figure 1, which clearly showed that 
there were substantial differences in the offer pattern of male and female offer curves 
(both offer curves for male and female players gradually took the same pattern of offer 
after the offer of Rs 40 and offers made less than Rs 40.  
 
Table 2 
Mean Comparison Analysis for Male and Female Offers in Round 1 
Variable Mean N SD  Assumptions T-stat P-value 
F1 37.538 65 8.5697 Equal Variances –2.39 0.0181 
M1 40.492 65 5.0563 Unequal Variances –2.39 0.0185 
 
8This test is used to investigate the significance of difference between two population distributions, 
based on two sample distributions [Kinji (1999)]. The method used here is that we have segregated the male and 
female offers with sample size n1 & n2, then we have calculated the cumulative distribution functions Sn1(Xm) 
& Sn2(Xf) for male and female sample respectively. Then we have calculated the absolute difference between 
cumulative distribution functions Sn1(Xm) & Sn2(Xf). Hence, the maximum value of the difference between 
Sn1(Xm) & Sn2(Xf) is calculated denoted as maximum value of D and compared with the critical value of the 
null hypothesis (Ho: Pm=Pf, H1: Pm≠Pf). As if the observed value exceeds the critical value the null 
hypothesis is rejected or otherwise. See Appendix 1 for explanation of Kolmogorov-Simrnov hypothesis. 
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Fig. 1.  Cumulative Distribution Curves for Male and Female Offers in Round 1 
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The logistic regression function was used to describe the probability of rejection 
for each given offer by including the gender variable first and then by dropping it. The 
logistic regression model given below: 
)(1
)exp(1)(
X
XXp β+α+
β+α
−=  
Where, p is the probability of rejection and X is the offer amount, as a proportion of the 
total stake. The rejection behaviour of each sample then is described by two parameters α 
and β. 
R  = φ  ( α + β O+ γ G) with gender variable … … … (1) 
R  = φ  ( α + β O) without gender variable … … … (2) 
Where:  φ  denotes the Cumulative Density Function for the Standard Normal 
Distribution. 
Where:  R = Response of Responders to the proposed offers by the Proposers. 
 O = Offers made by Proposers to the Responders.   
 G = Gender of Proposers. 
In this specification gender and response of the players were the dummies that take 
value “1” for female proposers and “0” for male proposers. Similarly, value “1” is also 
for the offers being accepted by the responders and “0” for the rejected offers. 
The results of logistic regression Equation (1) given in Table 3 imply that the role 
of gender on responder’s decision was insignificant. Also the test results do indicate that 
higher  offer  rate  increases the  probability of  acceptance for a given  offer (i.e., the  
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Table 3 
Logistic Regression Model including Gender Variable 
Variables 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 & 4 
Coefficient S.E Z -Stat P-Value Coefficient S.E Z-Stat P-Value Coefficient S.E Z-Stat P-Value 
Intercept (C) –24.7334 6.3252 –3.9102 0.0001 –38.3047 11.3363 –3.3789 0.0007 –23.6378 4.3067 –5.4887 0.0000 
Gender (G) –1.8431 1.2025 –1.5328 0.1253 –2.3009 1.6320 –1.4099 0.1586 –1.0974 0.7365 –1.4899 0.1363 
Offer (O) 0.7669 0.1897 4.0419 0.0001 1.1517 0.3422 3.3651 0.0008 0.6369 0.1101 5.7842 0.0000 
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coefficient of offers i.e. O = 0.7669). Therefore, the response of responder was not 
influenced by the gender of the players. In-fact there is no difference in rejections by 
gender—as both the sexes have the same behaviour regarding rejecting the unfair offers. 
Table 4, clearly showed that there is 100 percent rejection for all the offers below Rs 30 
and all the offers above Rs 40 were accepted by both male and females.  
Keeping the same phenomenon the logistic regression was also tested by dropping 
the gender variable from the model. Here, again the test results for Equation (2) given in 
Table 5 ascertain the results/estimates of the logistic Equation 3 with gender that higher 
the offer rate the higher will be the acceptance rate. Table 5 and Figure 2, where it was 
explained that the offer over Rs 40  were {having higher probability} always accepted 
and the offers below Rs 40 were always rejected.  
 
Fig. 2.  Logistic Regression Curve for Round 1 
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In short, the results of Round 1 do indicate that the pattern of offer for both male 
and female proposer was different from each other. Male proposers on average offered 
more than the female proposers; which was consistent with the results observed by Saad 
and Gill (2001). As Saad and Gill conducted a one shot UG and found that male offered 
more when paired with female players whereas, the female made equal offers 
independent of sex of the partner.  
 
(ii)  Round  2 
The second round of experimentation was also carried out without the knowledge 
of gender to both the parties. But there was slight change of design that the male players 
were making offers to male players and female to female.9  The game was played with 
complete anonymity on the part of both parties of players. 
 
9Experimenter was the only one who was well aware of the change in the design of experiment.  
Table 4 
Percentage Analysis for Acceptance and Rejection of Offers for Round 1 
Offer Range 
0 
to  
10 
11  
to  
20 
21 
 to  
30 
31 
 to  
40 
41 
 to  
50 
51 
 to  
60 
61  
to 
 70 
71 
to 
80 
81  
to  
90 
91  
to  
100 Sum 
Overall  Offers Male 0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.09 
(6/65) 
0.34 
(22/65) 
0.55 
(36/65) 
0.02 
(1/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
1.00 
 
Female 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.25 
(16/65) 
0.32 
(21/65) 
0.37 
(24/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
1.00 
 
Accepted Offers Male 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.34 
(22/65) 
0.55 
(36/65) 
0.02 
(1/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.91 
 
Female 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.26 
(17/65) 
0.37 
(24/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.66 
 
Rejected Offers Male 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.09 
(6/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.09 
 
Female 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.02 
(2/65) 
0.25 
(16/65) 
0.08 
(5/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00  
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.34 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Logistic Regression Model without Gender Variable 
Variables 
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 and 4 
Coefficient S.E Z-stat P-value Coefficient S.E Z-stat P-value Coefficient S.E Z-stat P-value 
Intercept (C) –25.2654 6.1479 –4.1095 0.0000 –32.6848 8.9174 –3.6653 0.0002 –24.2138 4.2095 –5.7521 0.0000 
O (Offer) 0.7481 0.1768 4.2327 0.0000 0.9523 0.2549 3.7360 0.0002 0.6309 0.1055 5.9782 0.0000 
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The overall average offer of male players was Rs 41.308 and by female players Rs 
38.662 (Table 6). It was observed that out of 65 MM and 65 FF offer, 78 percent of the 
male and 69 percent of female offers were accepted. However, the average rejection in 
MM and FF offers were Rs 30.02 and Rs 27.70. This pattern of offers by proposers and 
responders in comparison to round 1 showed that the both the parties have realised that if 
they want to earn or want to gain any monetary benefit then they have to make some 
what fair offer i.e., close to Rs 40 and above as the offers below Rs 40 were mostly 
rejected by both the parties in round 1. The overall rejection rate in FF and MM offers 
were 31 percent and 22 percent respectively. A surprising aspect in round 2 was that the 
female players have shown a little tendency of making some what higher offers because 
the average offer rate has increased which resultantly decreased the rejection rate of the 
female offers as compared to round 110 but this increase in offer rate is statistically 
insignificant (Table 8). Conversely, the rejection rates for male offers have increased as 
compared to round 1.11  While analysing the said behaviour it was revealed that in Round 
1 there were 34 percent and 44 percent of the offers made by female and male players 
within the range of Rs 31–50 respectively. On the other hand, in Round 2 the offers made 
by female players for the range of Rs 31–50 increases to 37 percent whereas, the male 
offers decreases to 41 percent. Therefore, it is safe to say that females have learnt from 
their past experience and made higher offers and males reduced their offers in wrong 
anticipation of opponent’s behaviour.  Thus there was a convergence in behaviour—
females increased their offers and males decreased their offers so that, in the second 
round, their was no significant difference in the male and female offers (unlike the first 
round). 
 
Table 6 
Descriptive Statistics for Round 2 
Round 2 (Unknown Gender)  
 Comparison of Offers (n=65) 
Percentage Mean 
Accept Reject Accept Reject 
Female Offers to Female (FF) 69% 31% Rs 43.49 Rs 27.70 
Male Offers to Male (MM) 78% 22% Rs 44.40 Rs 30.02 
 
Table 7 shows the majority of the male and female offers were in the offer range 
(41 to 50), i.e. 49 percent (32/65) and 45 percent (29/65) of the pie for male and female 
proposers respectively with 0 percent rejection rate. The overall offers which have been 
accepted and rejected falls with in the range of 69 percent (45/65) (female accepted 
offers) and 78 percent (51/65) (male accepted offers), whereas, the rejection rate for male 
offers was 22 percent (14/65) and for female offers 31 percent (20/65).  
During the interview session, it was concluded that the players have had a 
tendency to learn and coverage their offers to the average offers i.e. Rs 40 and above. 
This  was  also  discovered  that the  players  either  male or female do not like to have an  
 
10In Round 1 female rejection rate was 34 percent and in Round 2 female rejection rate was 31 percent 
(Tables 4 and 6). 
11In Round 1 male rejection rate was 9 percent and in Round 2 male rejection rate was 22 percent 
(Tables 4 and 6). 
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Table 7 
Percentage Analysis for Acceptance and Rejection of Offers for Round 2 
Offer Range 
0 
to 
10 
11 
to 
20 
21 
to 
30 
31 
to 
40 
41 
to 
50 
51 
to 
60 
61 
to 
70 
71 
to 
80 
81 
to 
90 
91 
to 
100 
 
Sum 
 
Overall  Offers Male 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.18 
(12/65) 
0.29 
(19/65) 
0.49 
(32/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
1.00 
Female 0.02 
(1/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.22 
(14/65) 
0.29 
(19/65) 
0.45 
(29/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
1.00 
Accepted Offers Male 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.26 
(17/65) 
0.49 
(32/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.78 
Female 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.25 
(16/65) 
0.45 
(29/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.69 
Rejected Offers Male 0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.18 
(12/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.22 
Female 0.02 
(1/65) 
0.03 
(2/65) 
0.22 
(14/65) 
0.05 
(3/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.00 
(0/65) 
0.31 
 
offer which is slightly unfair i.e. less than Rs 30. As majority of the offers below Rs 40 
were rejected because the players feel it unfair.12 
For detailed statistical analysis to examine the behavioural responses of the 
players, in this round of play pooled offer data was used. The results of K-S Test in Table 
1 indicated that there were no differences in the distributional pattern of the offers among 
male and female players as the computed p-value (p = 0.457) was greater than the level 
of significance α =0.05. Also the computed value of D = 0.138 was less than the critical 
value of D = 0.175 at n = 65. Table 8 showed the results for the test of mean comparison 
also imply that the offer pattern of male and female did not differ systematically from 
each other. This behavioural pattern has been presented graphically in Figure 3 showing 
no variation in the offer pattern of male and females across this round. It was also 
explained that the average male and female offers in Round 2 were (41.308 and 38.662 
respectively) insignificant to show any change in overall average offer pattern of male 
and female.  
 
Table 8 
Mean Comparison Analysis for Male and Female Offers in Round 2 
Variable Mean N SD  Assumptions T-stat P-value 
F2 38.662 65 9.2505 Equal Variances 1.78 0.0775 
M2 41.308 65 7.8281 Unequal Variances 1.78 0.0776 
 
 
12See offer ranges in Tables 4 and 7 and Offer pattern in Figures 1 and 3. Also During the experimental 
analysis of gender effect it was interestingly observed that as in rounds 1 and 2 the knowledge of gender was 
not known to both the parties and when they were asked about their behaviour/prediction that what type of 
offers they were trying to offer to responders and from responders that what type of offers they were expecting 
and were ready to accept. Both the parties answered (almost 92 percent of the players) that they were trying and 
expecting such an offer which can made both of them better off so in this pursuit they preferred for fair play. 
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Fig. 3. Cumulative Distribution Curves for Male and Female Offers in Round 2 
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If we look at Tables 3 and 5 for the logistic regression results for the regression 
with and without gender variable to analyse the behaviour of the responders it was 
observed that still the role of gender was insignificant in affecting the responder’s 
behaviour. The results of logistic regression were same as in Round 1 showing that as the 
offer rates were increasing acceptance rate for the given offers were also increasing. In 
contrast with Eckel and Grossman (2001), we find that there is no difference in rejection 
behaviour of males and females conditional on the offer received. However, since 
females received higher offers, they rejected less often in our experiment. 
This behaviour of the players was presented graphically in Figure 4. Where it was 
obvious that as the offer rate was getting closer to Rs 40. The acceptance rate was 
gradually rising and after Rs 40 showing almost 100 percent acceptance rate. At Rs 30 
and below, the rejection rate was 100 percent.  
 
Fig. 4.  Logistic Regression Curve for Round 2 
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The results observed in Round 2 were consistent with the findings of Sutter, et al. 
(2006), Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2004) and Bolton and Katok (1995) in which they 
employed to play a two player dictator game13 and found no differences in male and 
female offers. Similarly, we also found no differences in the offer pattern of male and 
female in Round 2 and conclude that in this Round of play male and female offers were 
same. As the structure of our study was based on the repeated games and the players were 
employed for the four sessions of real money play.  
 
Comparison of Rounds 1 and 2 
While comparing the male offers in Round 1 with male offers on Round 2 it was 
observed that the offer pattern of male players was not the same across the rounds as the K-S 
Test results for analysis male offers in Rounds 1 and 2 rejected the null hypothesis showing 
significant differences in the offer pattern of male players, because computed p-value was 
lower than α = 0.05, also the computed value of D (0.246) was higher than the critical value 
of D = 0.175 at n = 65 (Table 9).  This has been presented graphically in Figure 5. On the 
other hand, the comparative analysis of female offer pattern across both rounds (Round 1 and 
2) we found no significant change in the offer pattern of females as the K-S Test results 
showed in Table 10 accepted the null hypothesis showing no differences in the offer pattern of 
female players in both these rounds (the computed p-value = 0.614 is higher than the α = 
0.05 and also the computed D-value of D = 0.123 is lower than the critical value of D = 0.175 
at n = 65). Graphically this behaviour is represented in Figure 6. 
 
Table 9   
Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test for Inter Round Gender Analysis 
Variables 
Two Sample Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test  
(Two Tailed Test) 
M1 & M2 F1 & F2 
D 0.246 0.123 
P-value 0.023 0.614 
Alpha (Level of Significance) 0.05 0.05 
 
Fig. 5.  Cumulative Distribution Curves for Male Offers in Rounds 1 and 2 
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13The structure of game for Bolton and Katok (1995) and Eckel and Grossman (2001) were same. 
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Fig. 6. Cumulative Distribution Curves for Female Offers in Rounds 1 and  2 
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The mean comparison for male offers in Round 1 and male offers in Round 2 also gave a 
clear indication that on average there were no significant differences among the male and 
female offers across rounds (Tables 10 and 11).  
 
Table 10 
Mean Comparison Analysis for Male Offers in Rounds 1 and 2 
Variable Mean N SD  Assumptions T-stat P-value 
M1 40.492 65 5.0563 Equal Variances –0.71 0.4818 
M2 41.308 65 7.8281 Unequal Variances –0.71 0.4820 
 
Table 11 
Mean Comparison Analysis for female Offers in Rounds 1 and 2 
Variable Mean N SD  Assumptions T-stat P-value 
F1 37.538 65 8.5697 Equal Variances –0.72 0.4740 
F2 38.662 65 9.2505 Unequal Variances –0.72 0.4740 
 
Rounds 3 and 4 
The most distinctive point in both these rounds was that the players were having 
the complete knowledge of gender as both parties (proposers and responders were seated 
in-front of each other). Therefore, we have tried to make analysis of the results when the 
males were proposers and females were responders with results when the females were 
F1 
F2 
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proposers and males were responders. We combined all the offer data of all the 
experimental locations and tried to figure out how behavioural patterns of players 
changes or affected by the knowledge of gender.  
In round 3, when males were making offers to female players the acceptance rate 
was 93 percent and the average of accepted offers was Rs 50.80. Here, the male 
proposers have shown a strong tendency of offering more than even split of the money 
because 30 percent of the offers made were above Rs 50. This clearly showed that the 
behaviour of male players has changed considerably in comparison to rounds 1 and 2. As 
there was 68 percent of the male offers made with in the range of Rs 40 to 50. However, 
in round 4 female players were the proposers and the male players were responders and 
the behaviour of female players was quite different from previous two rounds. The 
tendency of offering more than Rs 50 was as low as 3 percent of the offers to male 
players. However, there is high proportion of female offers in the range of Rs 40 to 50 
(even split of money) i.e. 90 percent.  The overall average of accepted female offers was 
Rs 45.37 which was less than the male offers in round 3. Similarly, 74 percent of the 
female offers in round 4 were accepted by male players and 26 percent were rejected. It 
was observed that all the offer below Rs 45 were rejected by male players as the average 
of accepted offers was Rs 45.37 (Tables 12 and 13). During investigation it was found 
that males were expecting the same altruistic behaviour from females in round 4 but the 
females were more sensitive to fair play therefore males retaliated and rejected all the 
offers which were slightly unfair offers i.e., Rs 40 and below. From our interviews, it is 
clear that this is due to local cultural norms, which differ from those, prevalent in the 
Western cultures studied. 
 
Table 12 
Descriptive Statistics for Rounds 3 and 4 
Rounds 3 and 4  
  (Known Gender) Comparison of 
Offers (n=130) 
 
Percentage 
 
Mean 
Accept Reject Accept Reject 
  Male Offers to Female in R 3 (MF) 93% 7% Rs 50.58 Rs 31.33 
  Female Offers to Male in R 4 (FM) 74% 26% Rs 45.37 Rs 35.25 
 
Table 13 
Percentage Analysis for Acceptance and Rejection of Offers for Rounds 3 and 4 
Offer Range 
0 
to 
10 
11 
to 
20 
21 
to 
30 
31 
to 
40 
41 
to 
50 
51 
to 
60 
61 
to 
70 
71 
to 
80 
81 
to 
90 
91 
to 
100 Sum 
Overall  Offers M 0.01 
(1/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.02 
(2/130) 
0.10 
(13/130) 
0.58 
(76/130) 
0.22 
(28/130) 
0.05 
(6/130) 
0.02 
(2/130) 
0.01 
(1/130) 
0.01 
(1/130) 
1.00 
F 0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.07 
(9/130) 
0.32 
(41/130) 
0.58 
(76/130 
0.03 
(4/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
1.00 
Accepted Offers M 0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.05 
(7/130) 
0.58 
(76/130) 
0.22 
(28/130) 
0.05 
(6/130) 
0.02 
(2/130) 
0.01 
(1/130) 
0.01 
(1/130) 
0.93 
F 0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.01 
(1/130) 
0.15 
(19/130) 
0.55 
(72/130) 
0.03 
(4/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.74 
Rejected Offers M 0.01 
(1/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.02 
(2/130) 
0.05 
(6/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.07 
F 0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.06 
(8/130) 
0.17 
(22/130) 
0.03 
(4/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.00 
(0/130) 
0.26 
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Here, it can be seen that male have made much higher offers to female players. 
Therefore, it was obvious that acceptance rate was also high and rejection rate was low. 
But in response to high offers the female players have not made high offers which the 
male players were expecting. The female players have not deviated from their over all 
offer pattern and made the offers in the corridors of even split of money. In response, 
male players rejected all the offers which were below Rs 45. Comparing the results of 
both 3rd and 4th round it can be concluded that there has been strong reciprocal effect 
from the male side by not accepting any offer below Rs 45. 
The results of K-S test  (Table 1) showed that the null hypothesis of no-difference 
in male and female offers was rejected, as the computed P-value was lower than the level 
of significance also the computed value of D=0.331 was higher than the critical value of 
D=0.1193 at n=130. Therefore, we can conclude that distribution of male and female 
offers were statistically different from each other. This has also been explained 
graphically (Figure 7). In Figure 7, it was quite clear that the offer curves for both male 
and female proposers have no resemblance and they were showing different pattern of 
offers. As far as the females are concerned, offers starting from the range of Rs 20 to 30 
and it ended up to Rs 50  where as the male offer curve started from the Rs 0 to 20 and 
ended at Rs 100. The spread of male offers was wider than the female offers as majority 
of the female offers were clustering within the range of Rs 30 to 50, where as, the 
majority of the male offers were clustering within the range of Rs 40 to 60 but still there 
were few outliers (extreme offers very rarely observed) like the offer of Rs 10 and Rs 
100. 
Results of the test for mean comparison showed that on average male players were 
offering move as compared to female players i.e. average male offer = 49.462 and 
average female offer = 42.746. These results were also statistically significant to reject 
the hypothesis of no difference in male and female offers on average and it can clearly be 
interpreted that distributional gap in the offer behaviour of proposer exist in both rounds 
3 and 4 (Table 14). These results are in contradiction with the findings of Solnick (2001), 
Eckel and Grossman (2001), Dufwenberg and Muren (2005) and Botelho, et al. (2000) in 
which it was found that females on the average gave more to males. 
 
Fig. 7.  Cumulative Distribution Curves for Male and Female Offers in Rounds 3 and 4 
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Table 14 
Mean Comparison Analysis for Female Offers in Rounds 3 and 4 
Variable Mean N SD  Assumptions T-stat P-value 
M3 49.462 130 10.477 Equal Variances 6.29 0.0000 
F4 42.746 130 6.1887 Unequal Variances 6.29 0.0000 
 
It was observed that the results of logistic regression model (with and without 
gender variable) showed insignificant gender influence. Also the propensity of accepting 
higher offers was still their, means as the offer rate was increasing the probability of 
accepting the offer was also increasing (Tables 3 and 5). This same behaviour was also 
represented graphically in Figure 8 given below. 
 
Fig. 8.  Logistic Regression Curve for Rounds 3 and 4 
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Hence, it was concluded that distribution gap in the responder’s behaviour for a 
given offer were present. Moreover, the behavioural pattern of offering high was 
triggered by the knowledge of gender as both male and female proposers started offering 
more as compared to their average offers in Rounds 1 and 2. The effect of gender 
knowledge was more dominant on the male offers and almost more than 50 percent of the 
pie was offered. Whereas, the female offers were increased but not more than 50 percent 
of the pie. Such type of behaviour has not been observed in the literature. The modal 
(most common and ideal) offer according to ultimatum game theory was 50-50 percent of 
the pie [Camerer (2003)] and the results of this study support this argument. 
o istic Regression of R34 by O34 when the g nder effect  
is ns gnificant 
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Comparison of Pooled Offers of Rounds 1 and 2 with the Offers of Rounds 3 and 4 
In order to have a detailed comparison of offer pattern for all the rounds of play 
with and without the knowledge of gender, the offer data for rounds 1 and 2 was pooled 
and was then compared with the offer data of rounds 3 and 4.  
 
Table 15 
Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test for Distributional Analysis for  
Pooled Data of Rounds 1 and 2 with Rounds 3 and 4 
Variables Two Sample Kolmogorov-Simrnov Test (Two Tailed Test) 
D 0.3654 
P-value 7.6071 E-16 
Alpha (Level of Significance) 0.05 
 
Here, the K-S test results given in Table 15 clearly reject the hypothesis that both 
the distribution with gender and without gender knowledge was significantly different. 
As the computed p-value was lower than the significance level and along with that the 
computed value of D=0.3654 was higher than the critical value of D=0.1193. Hence, it 
can easily be derived that there were significant differences in the pattern of offers across 
rounds.  
The results also explained the fact that the range where there was high probability 
of acceptance was (40–60)  percent of the pie. The logistic curves presented in Figures 2, 
4 and 8 showed that majority of the offers were clustering within the said range of offers. 
Although, there were few offers which were over 60 percent of the pie with almost 100 
percent acceptance rate (as per the ultimatum theory)14 and there was high rejection rate 
for the offers below 40 percent of the pie.    
 
CONCLUSION 
This study reports the results of a series of experiments designed and conducted to 
determine the behavioural pattern of people in Pakistan. Unlike many previous studies, 
we found male offers to be more generous then female offers. Also, knowledge of gender 
increases the average offer in both MF (Male to Female) and FM (Female to Male) pairs. 
In particular, males offered more than 50 percent to females in about 30 percent of the 
cases, whereas this never occurred in female offers to males. Pakistani cultural norms of 
chivalry and courtesy towards females lead males to make hyperfair offers, and also to 
expect reciprocity. However, females are trained not to respond to overtures by males, 
and do not change behaviour. Males expect to be rewarded for high offers, and do not 
receive this reward and hence reject much more often than they do in earlier rounds15.  
The results of this paper are in contradiction with the evidence that females are more 
generous than the males [Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001); Eckel and Grossman (2001)]. 
It was also observed that in this particular study that the males displayed a rather severe 
reaction for unfair offers.  
 
14For detail survey analyses see Camerer (2003) and Roth (1995). 
15See Tables 13 and 14 offer and rejection pattern of male and female players in Rounds 3 and 4. 
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Cultural norms differ in Pakistan and Western societies. In West, women can make 
generous offers to males without being seen as forward or flirtatious. In Pakistan a girl 
offering more than 50 percent to a boy would be mis-understood as being forward. The 
third and fourth rounds showed the strong impact of reciprocity. Hyperfair offers by 
males were not reciprocated by females, and men retaliated by higher rejections. One 
important finding of this study was that the players did not show any fear of rejection 
while making their offers, as the male and female players during interviews explained 
that if they were having any concern for the fear of rejection of their offers they would 
defiantly offer much more in the other rounds of play. Therefore, we can conclude that 
the behaviour of the people of Pakistan is in contradiction with the conventional 
economic thinking [Eckel and Grossman (1996)]. 
 
APPENDIX-I 
 
The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test compares two distributions. This test is used for 
distribution fitting tests for comparing an empirical distribution determined from a 
sample with a known distribution. It can also be used for comparing two empirical 
distributions [Massey (1951)].  
 
Note: This test enables the similarity of the distributions to be tested at the same time as 
their shape and position.  
 
Take sample S1 comprising n1 observations, with F1 the corresponding empirical 
distribution function. Take second sample S2 comprising n2 observations, with F2 the 
corresponding empirical distribution function.  
The null hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is defined by: 
 
H0 : F1(x) = F2(x) 
 
The Kolmogorov statistic is given by: 
D1 is the maximum absolute difference between the two empirical distributions. Its value 
therefore lies between 0 (distributions perfectly identical) and 1 (separations perfectly 
separated). The alternative hypothesis associated with this statistic is: 
 
Ha: F 1(x)? F 2(x) 
 
The Smirnov statistics are defined by: 
The alternative hypothesis associated with D2 is: 
 
Ha : F1(x) < F 2(x) 
 
The alternative hypothesis associated with D3 is: 
 
Ha : F1(x) > F 2(x) 
 
Shahid Razzaque 
 
44 
APPENDIX-II 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
 
 
(ROUND #______    ID # __________ ) 
 
1. NAME    ____________________________________________________ 
2. EDUCATIONAL QUALIFICATION _____________________________ 
3. MARTIAL STATUS  (MALE/FEMALE)___________________________ 
4. AGE     ______________________________________________________ 
5. SALARY/POCKET MONEY (MONTHLY) Rs _____________________ 
6. NATIVE CITY / VILLAGE _____________________________________ 
 
 
7. For Proposer  
Have you made your offer/decision on the basis of: ( Tick as appropriate) 
• You Like Fairness 
• You are afraid of Rejection  
• You are kind enough to others (Altruistic) 
• Any other reason explain briefly. 
 
8. For Responder 
Have you made your decision ** on the basis of: (Tick as appropriate) 
• You Like Fairness 
• You are kind enough to others (Altruistic) 
• As a Reaction (Reciprocation) 
• Any other reason explain briefly 
**= your decision (Accept/Reject) Offer. 
 
APPENDIX-III 
 
DECISION SLIP 
 
Round # _______   For  Rupees ______ 
 
P1 ID #________   P1 Offer _________ 
 
                 P2 ID # ________  P2 Decision (A/R) 
 
**    A= Accept   R= Reject 
 
Ultimatum Game and Gender Effect 
 
45 
APPENDIX-IV 
Abbreviations 
M1 – Offers by male proposers in Round-1 
M2 – Offers by male proposers in Round-2 
M3 – Offers by male proposers in Round-3 
F1 – Offers by female proposers in Round-1 
F2 – Offers by female proposers in Round-2 
F4 – Offers by female proposers in Round-4 
R1 – Offers rejected in Round-1 
R2 – Offers rejected in Round-2 
R3 – Offers rejected in Round-3 
R4 – Offers rejected in Round-4 
R34 – Offers rejected in Rounds-3 and 4 
O1 – Offers made in Round-1 
O2 – Offers made in Round-2 
O3 – Offers made in Round-3 
O4 – Offers made in Round-4 
O34 – Offers made in Rounds-3 and 4 
M – Male Offers 
F – Female Offers 
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